Sigrid Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth Century China by Amelung, Iwo
90                                                                                        EASTM 37 (2013)/2014 
 
Sigrid Schmalzer, The People’s Peking Man: Popular Science and Human 
Identity in Twentieth Century China, Chicago, London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2008, 346 pp. 
Iwo Amelung 
[Iwo Amelung is professor of Chinese studies at Goethe-University Frankfurt am 
Main. He received his PhD. from Free University Berlin with a thesis on 
indundations and regulation of the Yellow River during the late Qing dynasty. He 
currently is working on the reform of the examination system during the very late 
Qing. He has published widely on different aspects of the dissemination and 
appropriation of Western knowledge in China during the late Qing and the 
Republican Era. Contact: amelung@em.uni-frankfurt.de] 
The People’s Peking Man is a very welcome contribution to the still rather 
limited research on issues of science and technology in twentieth-century 
China. The book mainly deals with two topics: certain aspects of the 
development of paleoanthropological research, and the question of the 
popularisation of science (kepu 科普 , short for kexue puji 科學普及) in 
modern China. In a wider sense it is concerned with the question of human 
identity and the influence of evolutionary science on perceptions of what it 
means to be human. Schmalzer especially highlights the importance of the 
slogan “labour created humanity” from Frederick Engels’ article fragment 
“Anteil der Arbeit an der Menschwerdung des Affen.” 
Questions of paleoanthropological research and the problem of how 
research actually was carried out is not the main focus of the book. Still, the 
author makes a number of interesting observations in this regard. Mainly 
on the basis of the extensive literature on the discovery of Peking Man, she 
treats questions such as to what extent the discovery of the Peking Man 
fossils was made by Chinese, what role technicians and non-scientists 
played in the scientific enterprise, and to what extent modern Chinese 
paleoanthropology could draw on proto-scientific indigenous practices. 
Schmalzer especially highlights the fact that the hunt for “dragon bones” 
(longgu 龍骨) had a long tradition in China, since these “bones,” which 
were used in traditional Chinese pharmacology, more often than not were 
actually fossils. The issue at stake here is the relationship between science 
and the nation or, to be more concrete, the question of the localization of 
science and the contribution of local resources to “universal science.” 
Already in 1931, Ren Hongjun 任鴻寯 (1881-1961), one of the most im-
portant organizers of Chinese science during the Republican era (and at the 
same time a very influential populariser of science) had pointed out that, in 
China, sciences related to the natural environment, such as “geology, 
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zoology, botany, paleontology, and archaeology,” had developed best. 1 
Schmalzer’s book thus touches on issues of the circulation and appro-
priation of scientific knowledge that have become an important focus of 
historical research and are intensively discussed within the framework of 
research on “science in the periphery” 2 and “colonial science.” It is indeed 
tempting to relate Schmalzer’s research to explorations into the question of 
colonial science, and employ ideas such as those developed by Prakash in 
order to ask in which respects paleoanthropological practice in China can 
be considered as a form of the “tropicalisation of science.” 3 
More important to the author—and with very good reason—is the 
question of the popularization of science. Indeed, despite the ubiquity and 
obvious importance of the popularization of science in China, the topic has 
hardly been subjected to systematic research. Schmalzer describes the 
qualitative changes that can be observed in these efforts after the founding 
of the PR China in 1949, but also hints at a line of tradition, relating them to 
precedents in the Republican era. This of course is correct, and it is 
astounding to recall how consciously and systematically movements for 
the “scientification” (kexuehua 科學化) of the Chinese public were carried 
out in Republican China. 4  Yet, major efforts for the popularisation of 
science can actually be traced back to an even earlier period, namely the 
very beginning of the 20th century. These efforts relied on books and 
popular magazines and already discussed questions related to human 
evolution, etc.5 Given the close relationship between the popularization of 
science and the idea to “Save China through Science” (kexue jiuguo 科學救
國), which became particularly widespread during the Republican era, it 
would have been interesting to look into the question of to what extent 
paleoanthropological research was integrated into this discourse, or 
whether it even may have been the motivation for paleoanthropologists to 
deal with the topic in the first place, as was the case in other scientific 
                                                          
1 Zen, H. C. (i.e., Ren Hongjun), “Science: Its Introduction and Development in 
China,” in: Chen Zen Sophia H. (ed.), Symposium on Chinese Culture, Shanghai: 
China Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931, pp. 142-151. 
2 Papanelopoulou, Faidra Nieto-Galan, and Enrique Agustí Perdriguero (eds.), 
Popularizing Science and Technology in the European Periphery, 1800-2000, Farnham: 
Ashgate Publ., 2009.  
3  Prakash, Gyan, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999. 
4 See especially Duan Zhiwen 段治文, Zhongguo xiandai kexue wenhua de xingqi 
1919-1936 中國現代科學文化的興起  1919-1936 (The Rise of Modern Scientific 
Culture in China 1919-1936), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2001. 
5 Shi Gexin 史革新, “Xinhai geming yu jindai kexue chuanbo” 辛亥革命與近代科
學傳播 (The 1911 Chinese Revolution and the Spread of Modern Science), Beijing 
shifan daxue xuebao (Renwen shehui kexue ban), 2001:6, pp. 25-35. 
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areas.6 In this regard it is important to keep in mind that not only science 
and evolution were popularized during the Republican era, but that there 
was also an influential streak of “anti-evolutionary” and “creationist” 
thought disseminated by Christian media throughout the Republican era.7 
Such critiques provided a basis for creationist accounts of the origins of 
humans, including the highly interesting example recounted by Schmalzer 
that managed to get published in the PR China as late as 1951 (p. 78). 
Schmalzer is right to stress that many publications related to the 
popularization of science were closely related to the goal of eradicating 
“superstition” or mixin, as the Japanese neologism was read in China. 
Campaigns against “superstition” actually began during the very late Qing 
dynasty and were massive—and destructive—in scope. From the start, 
being labelled as “superstitious” was highly dangerous and amounted to 
being considered an “enemy of science.” It is no accident that during the 
Republican era religious groups, Christians as well as Buddhists, expended 
much effort to categorize “superstitions” with the goal of escaping the label 
“superstitious” themselves.8 Evolution, according to Schmalzer, stood for 
progress and national salvation, in contrast to a past of “superstition” and 
weakness. The author argues that in China it was easier to replace religious 
interpretations of human origins with scientific ones, since “China had no 
indigenous belief system that suffered quite so devastating a challenge 
from evolutionism as Christianity did in the West, or that wielded such 
political influence.” (p. 5). While I agree with the first part of Schmalzer’s 
assertion with a view to the question of creation, I would suggest that it is 
necessary to keep in mind the concrete political and economic goals of the 
campaigns against “superstition” as well. One important aim was the 
extension of the power of the state (including its extractive powers) to the 
grassroots level. From the point of view of the modernizing state, different 
layers of popular religion as well as ubiquitous practices of divination and 
prognostication tended to obstruct this goal, so that we should rather speak 
                                                          
6 Wang Zuoyue, “Saving China through Science: The Science Society, Scientific 
Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China,” Osiris 17 (2002), pp. 291-322, 
see also Fan Hongye 樊洪業, Zhang Jiuchun 張久春 (eds.), Kexue jiuguo zhi meng: 
Ren Hongjun wencun 科學救國之夢 : 任鴻寯文存  (The Dream of Saving China 
through Science. Writings of Ren Hongjun), Shanghai: Shanghai keji jiaoyu 
chubanshe, 2002. 
7  Zhang Binglun and Wang Zhichun, “The Struggle between Evolutionary 
Theory and Creationism in China,” in: Fan Dainian and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), 
Chinese Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (Boston Studies 
in the philosophy of science 179), Dordrecht: Kluver, 1996, pp. 327-346. 
8 See especially the massive Li Ganchen 李幹忱, Pochu mixin quanshu 破除迷信全
書 (Complete Collection on the Eradication of Superstition), Shanghai: Meiyimeihui 
quanguo shubaobu, 1924, that was compiled by protestant groups. 
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of influential belief systems in the case of China that were certainly less 
tightly organized than the Christian churches, but as a whole yielded 
considerable power to negatively influence the state’s modernization 
agenda.9 
Schmalzer shows that the term mixin acquired a high degree of 
flexibility, and that it was even used to criticise the cult of Mao Zedong in 
the 1970s (p. 179)—actually, the first article written on this issue by Li 
Honglin 李洪林 in 1978 contained a strong reminder of the incompatibility 
of science and superstition. 10  Already during the Great Leap Forward, 
mixin had been employed to criticize those who believed that the masses 
were incapable of practicizing science. Schmalzer sees this 
“reconfiguration” as something positive (p. 121) and a real step forward on 
the path toward “mass science.” To me, however, this twist in employing 
the notion of mixin rather indicates that mixin had early on become a tool of 
Party propaganda that targeted everything considered harmful by the 
Party. During the 1960s, Khrushchev was attacked because he called the 
veneration of Stalin “superstition.” This flexibility of the term, which 
extends to the contemporary propaganda against Falungong, makes its 
application as an “actor’s category,” as Schmalzer explicitly attempts (p. 
xviii), rather problematic. To put it differently, a closer look into the 
changing semantic value of the notion that is so central to Schmalzer’s 
work could help to gain an even deeper understanding of ideas related to 
science from this period.  
Not all effects of the popularization of science are intended by the 
popularisers. Schmalzer provides some interesting examples. In the case of 
the evolution of humanity, there is a surprisingly widespread tendency to 
celebrate the “primitivism” not only of early humans, but also of the so 
called “minority people.” Popularization of science also has contributed to 
the interest in “mysteries” and fringe theories. Schmalzer’s prime example 
is the Chinese search for the Yeti or “wild man,” a subject that fascinated 
the masses as much as parts of the scientific establishment. In spite of 
concentrated research activities, however, no representative of this species 
has been discovered. Schmalzer also mentions the case of the rocket 
scientist Qian Xuesen 錢學森 (1911-2009) and his propagation of research 
into “human body science” and so called teyi gongneng 特異功能  or 
                                                          
9 Cf., for example, Duara, Prasenjit, “Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of 
Modernity: The Campaigns Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century 
China,” Journal of Asian Studies 50:1 (1991), pp. 67-83. 
10 Li Honglin 李洪林, “Kexue he mixin” 科學和迷信 (Science and Superstition), 
Renmin ribao 2.10.1978. 
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“exceptional abilities,” such as telekinesis and so on.11 The popularization 
of such theories, as Schmalzer notes, contributed to the success of religious 
sects such as Falungong. 12 Such Janus-faced results of the popularization of 
science can already be observed in the emergence of “parapsychological” 
or “mesmerist” strains of thought in the early Republican era.13 
In her book Schmalzer is rather critical of Barry Sautman’s article 
“Peking Man and the Politics of Paleoanthropological Nationalism in 
China.” While Schmalzer is aware of the nationalist implications and 
temptations paleoanthropological research may offer, she points out that, 
contrary to Sautman’s assumptions, the “Out-of-Africa Theory” that locates 
the origins of modern humans in Africa has a quite large number of 
followers in China, and found its way into popular publications as well. 
While she is certainly right in contesting Sautman’s rather unbalanced 
presentation of the state of palaeoanthropological research in China, she 
remains sceptical of “multiregionalism” herself. It is thus rather ironic that 
very recent developments (after publication of Schmalzer’s book)—such as 
the discovery of the Xuchang Man—tend to confirm that the proponents of 
the “multiregional” thesis—the main objects of Sautman’s criticism—may 
have a point after all. In view of such discussions, Schmalzer makes the 
important point that Chinese paeleoanthropological research may in fact 
allow for another kind of nationalism, namely for celebrating the 
contributions of Chinese fossils and the labours of Chinese scientists to the 
development of universal science (p. 269).  
With regard to the development of nationalist ideas related to the 
popularization of paleoanthropological research, Schmalzer observes a 
discourse that attempts to integrate the different fossils found in China into 
a shared Chinese ancestry. Indeed, she highlights that the term “ancestor” 
(zuxian 祖先) is frequently used when dealing with the fossils of Peking 
Man, Yuanmou Man, and others. She notes, however, that praying to these 
ancestors, as people visiting the Yuanmou site quite often do, “smacks of 
superstition” (p. 281). But such practices can also be interpreted as part of a 
government-sponsored nationalism in line with the large-scale officially 
                                                          
11 Cf. Karchmer, Eric, “Magic, Science, and Qigong in Contemporary China,” in: 
Blum, Susan D, and Lionel M. Jensen (eds.), China off Center: Mapping the Margins of 
the Middle Kingdom, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, pp. 311-322. 
12 See now Ownby, David, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Oxford, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
13 Huang Kewu 黃克武, “Minguo chunian Shanghai lingxue yanjiu: Yi ‘Shanghai 
lingxuehui’ wei li,” 民國初年上海的靈學研究：以「上海靈學會」為例 (Research 
into Spiritualism in Early Republican Shanghai: A Study of the Shanghai 
Spiritualism Society), Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishisuo yanjiu jikan 55 (2007), pp. 
99-136. 
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sponsored ceremonies conducted annually at the supposed tomb of the 
Yellow Emperor on Qingming Day. 14 
One of the main concerns of Schmalzer’s book is related to the question 
of “mass science.” The author identifies two periods during which mass 
science played the most important role, namely during the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution. These developments are treated in 
chapters four and five of the book. In respect to the Great Leap Forward, 
Schmalzer comes to the conclusion that the idea of mass science—the 
participation of the masses in scientific activities—was seriously compro-
mised by the assumption of the superstitious nature of the population, 
which invalidated from the onset all attempts of mass participation in 
science. In contrast, Schmalzer is quite clearly of the opinion that “mass 
science” has to be viewed as a potentially fruitful approach, or, in other 
words, that the model has not only ideological but also theoretical validity. 
Yet, already during the Great Leap Forward, the demand for “mass 
science” and its propagandist use helped to undermine the authority of 
science. It was a tool with which to discipline scientists and force them to 
voice their support for the disastrous politics of the Great Leap. While 
Schmalzer dutifully acknowledges the terrible number of deaths resulting 
from the famine provoked by these policies, this aspect is treated merely in 
passing.15 But in some instances “false science” was directly responsible for 
bringing about famine, especially through the application of Lysenkoist 
ideas and unfounded “new” agricultural techniques, such as deep-
ploughing, close-planting, etc. Moreover, the propaganda for mass science 
was combined with a strong current of fervour for ideological orthodoxy, 
the fallout from which extended to many scientific disciplines, including 
physics, chemistry and mathematics,16 not to mention the many human 
tragedies among Chinese scientists. Schmalzer explicitly acknowledges that 
she harbours somewhat idealistic views regarding the necessity of the 
participation of the “masses” in scientific enterprises (p. 300). For this 
reason she is unhappy that science is rarely discussed in accounts of the 
Cultural Revolution. She suggests to make up for this lack by taking 
“seriously the stated goals and methods of Cultural Revolution era ‘mass 
                                                          
14 Billeter, Térence, L´Empereur jaune: Une tradition politique chinoise, Paris: Les 
Indes savants, 2007. 
15 The most important case is the one of Qian Xuesen, who provided a “scientific 
proof” for increasing crop yields by a factor of twenty, cf. Chang, Iris, Thread of the 
Silkworm, New York: Basic Books, 1995, pp. 240-245. Similar articles were written by 
other scientists, among them He Zuoxiu 何祚庥. 
16 Cf. Hu Huakai胡化凱 and Gou Wenzeng 勾文增, “Ershi shiji wushi niandai 
houqi zhongguo duiyu ziran kexue de pipan,” 二十世紀五十年代後期中國對於自然
科學的批判 (Critique of the Natural Sciences in China at the End of the 50s of the 
20th Century), Kexue wenhua pinglun 2004:5, pp. 12-29. 
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science’,” an approach that she describes as “in some way similar to 
accounts published during the late Cultural Revolution by Western visitors 
to China” (p. 137). Although Schmalzer eventually arrives at a critical 
evaluation of Cultural Revolution science, her narrative at times becomes 
strangely one-sided, more or less downplaying the disastrous effects of the 
Cultural Revolution on scientists and the vicious criticisms of scientific 
ideas. The examples given for the scientific achievements of the Cultural 
Revolution are but the standard fare, noted by apologists of the Cultural 
Revolution such as Mobo Gao et al.,17 and not put into the necessary critical 
perspective.18 Even the interesting examples taken from the journal Fossils 
are not entirely convincing, because this periodical held a rather privileged 
position owing to the fact that Mao Zedong himself had a special interest in 
the subject, ensuring that Fossils was one of the very few journals published 
during the Cultural Revolution in the first place. Given the focus of the 
book, it would certainly be too much to expect a comprehensive account of 
how science and scientists were treated during the Cultural Revolution, 
including, for instance, the activities of government sponsored critique 
groups, such as that led by Li Ke 李柯.19 But it would have been quite 
appropriate to remind readers of the havoc that ideology could and did 
cause for science, and offering a comparative perspective of how science 
and scientists fared under other totalitarian regimes.20  
Such criticisms notwithstanding, the book certainly is worth reading. It 
is very well researched, based on an impressive range of source materials—
including information gained from interviews and fieldtrips—and lucidly 
written. Some editorial decisions are hard to stomach, however, at least for 
this reviewer. Why does the author at times mention important actors, 
without giving names, such as referring to “a German naturalist” on p. 35 
                                                          
17 Gao, Mobo et al, The Battle for China’s Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution, 
London: Pluto Press, 2008. 
18 It remains unclear, for example, whether the author really considers efforts of 
earthquake-prediction with the help of the masses as a success. On the question of 
earth-quake prediction, see: Chen Yong, Tsoi Kam-ling, Chen Feibi, Gao Zhenhuan, 
Zou Qijia, and Chen Zhangli, The Great Tangshan Earthquake of 1976: An Anatomy of 
Disaster, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988, pp. 129-144.  
19 A very useful collection of relevant material was published in 2009, cf. Hu 
Huakai 胡化凱 (ed.), 20 shiji 50-70 niandai Zhongguo kexue pipan ziliaoxuan 20世紀 50-
70年代中國科學批判資料選 (Selected Material on the Criticism of Science in China 
from the 1950s to the 1970s) (Zhongguo jin xiandai kexue jishushi yanjiu congshu), 
Jinan: Shandong jiaoyu chubanshe, 2009. 
20  See for example Walker, Mark (ed.), Science and Ideology. A Comparative 
History, London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 35-65. 
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(the person meant is of course K.A. Haberer)21 or an “influential anarchist” 
on p. 28 (from the footnote it becomes clear that she means Zhang Binglin)? 
Writing of Chinese “leading citizens” (p. 27) without providing names 
seems a rather idiosyncratic choice as well. Neither the explanation given 
for not providing Pinyin pronunciations in the main text nor for not 
providing characters in the bibliography is compelling. Both omissions 
constitute a major annoyance for readers who are stimulated by 
Schmalzer’s arguments to look into her sources. 
 
 
                                                          
21 Cf. Anderson, Johann Gunnar, Children of the Yellow Earth, London: Kegan 
Paul, 1934, p. 76. 
